For single-photon quantum key generation between two users, it is shown that for collective attacks the use of a shared secret key extended via a pseudo-random number generator may simultaneously enhance the security and efficiency of the cryptosystem. This effect arises from the intrinsic performance difference between quantum detectors with versus without knowledge of the key, a purely quantum *
effect and a new principle for key generation. No intrusion level estimation is needed and the method is directly applicable to realistic systems involving multi-photon sources, losses, noises, and finite-sequence statistical fluctuations. It is suggested that such use of a secret key be routinely incorporated in a quantum key generation system. The use of a secret key in quantum direct encryption is also indicated.
Considerable progress has been made in the field of quantum cryptography [1] , mainly in quantum key generation (QKG) where fresh keys can in principle be generated between two users, Adam and Babe, with informationtheoretic security against an active attacker Eve for single-photon systems in the asymptotic limit. This involves an advantage creation process during which the users establish, via quantum effects, a better communication channel between themselves for their selected data and measurement results compared to what Eve may get. They then employ error correction and privacy amplification to obtain a final generated key that Eve has little information about, which can be utilized for other purpose such as the secret key in a direct encryption system. However, the problems of quantifying the actual security level and efficiency of a realistic finite bit-sequence QKG system remain unsolved. One source of the difficulty is the statistical fluctuation in a concrete cryptosystem where the sequence of quantum states is finite.
Thus, during the process of intrusion-level estimation (ILE) in which the users create their advantage over Eve, false alarms may occur that adversely affect the final security and efficiency tradeoff of the overall cryptographic protocol [4] . Also, the side information leaked to Eve during error correction and privacy amplification is hard to estimate accurately [2] , and accounting for them via simple bounds [3] often lead to precipitous drops in efficiency.
There are also well-known problems from system imperfections, and other problems to be explained elsewhere.
In this paper, the direct use of a shared secret seed key expanded via a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) to a running key that determines the choice of basis in standard 4-state BB84 is proposed and analyzed against individual and collective attacks. In general, such use of a shared secret key allows the users to create advantage via the optimal quantum receiver principle:-Even if a full copy of the quantum state is available to Eve, the optimal quantum detector that the users may employ with knowledge of the secret key performs better than the optimal detector Eve may employ by a quantum measurement without knowledge of the key even if she may subsequently use the key on her measurement result. This performance difference does not exist if the system is described classically. This principle, called KCQ (keyed communication in quantum noise) key generation, constitutes a new and more powerful advantage creation mechanism via quantum effect.
It was described in ref [4] , briefly in ref [5] , and mentioned in ref. [6] where the use of a PRNG on mesoscopic coherent states for direct encryption was experimentally demonstrated that does not involve the above KCQ key generation principle. With the many possibilities of different implementations, the power of this principle is illustrated in this paper for single-photon BB84 and corresponding Ekert protocols. It will be shown how the security/efficiency of a concrete BB84 cryptosystem may be improved and quantified. Among the advantages are the alleviation of the problems mentioned in the last paragraph. Its use for quantum direct encryption (QDE) will also be indicated.
Some of the presented results have been given in ref [4] along with a more detailed general treatment, but the present paper is self-contained.
Consider the standard 4-state single-photon BB84 cryptosystem, in which each data bit is represented by one of two possible bases of a qubit, say the vertical and horizontal states |1 , |3 , and the diagonal states |2 , |4 . In standard BB84, the choice of basis is revealed after Babe makes her measurements, and the mismatched ones are discarded. It has been suggested [7] that some advantages obtain whe a secret key is used for basis determination with usual ILE and the resulting protocol is also secure against joint attacks [8] . Clearly, no key can be generated after subtracting the one-bit basis determination secret key if a fresh key is used for each qubit. It was proposed in refs. [7, 8] that a long m-bit secret key is to be used in a longer n-qubit sequence with repetition. However, even if such use does not affect the av-erage information that Eve may obtain, it gives rise to such an unfavorable distribution that security is seriously compromised. This is because with a probability 1/2, Eve can guess correctly the basis of a whole block of n/m qubits by selecting the qubits where the same secret bit is used repetitively.
For a numerical illustration, let n = 10 4 and m = 10 3 . Then with a probability 2 −n/m ∼ 10 −3 , Eve can successfully launch an opaque (intercept/resend) attack that gives full information on the whole 10 4 -bit sequence while yielding no error to the users. In general, the strong correlation from such repetitive use would seriously affect the appropriate quantitative security level [9] .
This problem is alleviated when a seed key K s is first passed through a PRNG to yield a running key K r that is used for basis determination, as indicated in Fig. 1 . In practice, any standard cipher running in the streamcipher mode [10] can be used as a PRNG. Even a LFSR (linear feedback shift register) is good in the present situation. A LFSR with openly known (minimal) connection polynomial and initial state K s generates a "pseudorandom" output with period 2 |Ks| [10] . When a LFSR is used as a (classical) stream cipher, it is insecure against known-plaintext attack [10] , in which
Eve would obtain the seed key from the running key which is itself obtained from the input data and the output bits. However, there is no such attack in key generation where Adam picks his data bits randomly. In an attack where Eve guesses the key, the system is undermined completely with a probability of 2 −|Ks| . Since it is practically easy to have |K s | ∼ 10 3 or larger in a stream cipher, such a guessing attack would have a much lower, and indeed insignificant, probability of success compared to, say, the guessing attack Eve may launch by guessing the message authentication key used to create the public channel needed in BB84. Next, we show that the seed key has complete information-theoretic security against ciphertext-only attacks. Let ρ k x be the quantum state corresponding to data sequence x = x 1 · · · x n and running key k 1 · · · k n . For attacking the seed key K s or running key K r , the quantum ciphertext re-
where p x is the apriori probability of x. In our KCQ approach, we grant a full copy of the quantum state to Eve for the purpose of bounding her information [11] . By an optimal measurement on the qubits, 6
Eve's probability of correctly identifying k (i.e., K r ) and then K s may be obtained via ρ k . Since each qubit is modulated by its own corresponding data bit, we have ρ
xn . For uniform data commonly assumed for key generation, the X i are independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.)
Bernoulli random variables with equal probabilities. Thus each ρ
after averaging over x i for any value of k i , with resulting
completely independent of k. So Eve can obtain no information on K r or K s at all even if she possesses a full copy of the quantum signal.
Next, we quantify the minimum security level against collective attacks on the random data, for which Eve is assumed to have a full copy of the quantum signal. By "collective attack " we mean the situation where Eve performs a constant qubit-by-qubit measurement on her (fictitious) full copy in the absence of any knowledge on K s or K r , but may employ a collective classical processing of the measurement results to take into account correlations induced by K s . This is analogous but different from the usual "collective attacks" in BB84, because there is no question of probe setting in the present case. Since the term "individual attack" in BB84 does not include collective classical processing, our use of the term "collective attack" is appropriate and allows the further generalization to joint measurements in the most general case of "joint attacks" [12] . Whatever the terminology, it is assumed in our KCQ approach that K s or K r is actually never revealed to Eve, so that all her knowledge of the secret key must come from her quantum measurements.
Practically, so long as Eve does not have long-term quantum memory, she would need to measure the qubits even if she could obtain K r at a future time, which is actually impossible if the key is never used again.
Nevertheless, solely for the purpose of lower bounding Eve's information (which is difficult to estimate otherwise because of the correlations introduced by K s among the qubits), we conceptually grant Eve the actual K s , and hence K r , after she made her measurements. Our KCQ principle of key generation via optimal quantum receiver performance with versus without knowledge of K s is easily seen to work here: Even with a full copy of the quantum state
Eve is bound to make errors in contrast to the users. Indeed, her optimal measurement can be found by parametrizing an arbitrary orthogonal basis which she measures, and optimizing the parameter assuming that K s is then granted to her. It is readily shown that more general POVM measurements reduce to othogonal ones in this optimum binary quantum decision problem on a qubit. It is not surprising that her optimal error rate is ∼ 0.15 and is obtained via the "Breidbart" basis [13] well-known in BB84, for which one basis vector bisects the angle between |1 and |2 or |2 and |3 depending on the bit assignment, and also in this case by the basis obtained by rotating the Breidbart basis by π/4. Note that there is no corresponding quantification of Eve's information for collective attacks on finite-n BB84 protocols.
It may be observed that security against joint attacks seems to be also obtained, for the same reason that Eve would make many more errors except with an exponentially small (in |K s |) probability, while the users make none in the noiseless limit. However, there are problems of counting the secret key bits used and the appropriateness of the entropy condition [9] . A detailed treatment of joint-attack security will be given elsewhere.
A key verification phase is to be added in a complete protocol after error correction and privacy amplification, which should always be employed in key generation for practical reasons. For this purpose, one may produce a short hashed version K ′ g of the final generated key K g , and encrypt K Eve's error rate goes to the maximum value 1/2 for collective attacks also, not just individual attacks [4] . Also, the scheme evidently works in the same way for Ekert type protocols that involve shared entangled pairs. Furthermore, the same principle may be employed for coherent-state systems with considerable number of photons [4, 5] , although the corresponding security analysis is more involved and would be treated in detail elsewhere.
In the present approach, error correction may be carried out by a forward error correcting code and the resulting performance analysis is not burdened by the need to consider Eve's probe and whether she may hold it with quantum memory. If the channel is estimated to have an error rate below 15%, advantage is created against collective attacks as shown above, and the existence of a protocol that yields a net key generation rate may be proved asymptotically as usual [14] . This channel error rate estimation is not for advantage creation, and is not necessary in two-way interactive error-correcting procedures, because the KCQ principle already guarantees the users' advantage over Eve. It is for correcting the users' channel noise and can be carried out any time for channel characterization, in contrast to intrusion level estimation.
In particular, as long as the channel error rate p c is below the threshold ∼ 0.15, the users would employ an error correcting code with rate R such ing Renyi entropy for applying the privacy amplification theorem [2] . With ILE in concrete BB84 protocols, this entropy estimate has never been carried out, with the difficulty compounded by finite-n statistical fluctuations. The problem is, however, much alleviated for KCQ protocols for which a single quantum copy is already granted to Eve for quantitatively bounding her information. The correct way to deal with this problem using a proper security criterion would be detailed elsewhere.
The complete key generation protocol, to be called qb-KCQ, is given schematically as follows:
(i) Adam sends a sequence of n random bits by a sequence of n qubit product states, each chosen randomly among two orthogonal bases via a running key K r generated by using a PRNG on a seed key K s shared by Babe.
(ii) An error control and privacy amplification procedure is employed by the users to correct their channel errors and obtain a final generated key K g , while assuring that even after all the associated side information and a full copy of the quantum state is granted to Eve, errors remain for her so she has little information on K g .
(iii) The users employ key verification similar to message authentication to verify that they share the same K g .
The above protocol can be easily modified for performing direct data encryption. Instead of randomly chosen bits, Adam sends the data out as in (i) with error control coding but no privacy amplification. The key verification (iii) becomes just the usual message authentication. The efficiency and security of such qb-QDE systems against various attacks will be detailed in the future. Note that QDE is not possible with BB84 or its secret-key modification in refs [7, 8] , the former because of key sifting, the latter because of the serious security breach of Eve getting correctly a whole block of n/m data bits with probability 1/2 described above.
In sum, the advantages of qb-KCQ over the corresponding single-photon BB84 are:
(1) Efficiency is increased in that there are no wasted qubits and no need for public communication except for key verification, while security is increased at the same time, especially for large number of possible bases. (3) The security/efficiency analysis is unaffected even for a multi-photon source whose output state is diagonal in the photon-number representation [15] , as a full copy of the single-photon state is already granted to Eve for bounding her information.
(4) The security/efficiency quantification is similarly extended to realistic lossy situations, while new analysis not yet performed is otherwise needed to take into account, e.g., attacks based on approximate probabilistic cloning [16] .
(5)
The security/efficiency analysis is also similarly extended to include any side information for a finite-n protocol, with no question of holding onto the probes.
(6) Direct encryption without going through key generation first may be employed, which is impossible for BB84.
In conclusion, a new approach involving shared secret key and the KCQ principle for obtaining secure and efficient qubit key generation has been described that dispenses with intrusion level estimation and that also allows quantum direct encryption. Since a shared secret key is already needed for message authentication during protocol execution in all current quantum key generation protocols, one should also employ a seed key expanded to a running key, as in our qb-KCQ scheme, to enhance simultaneously the security and efficiency of the cryptosystems.
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